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economies beginning in 2001 has brought new attention to the real economic
effects of asset price bubbles once more (Bordo, Jeanne 2002; Borio, Lowe
2002;Detken,Smets 2004).The major findings are,first,that it is important to
consider in which asset markets the bubble occurs: Real effects are partic-
ularly severe if a bubble occurs in the real estate market,but also stock prices
canhavesubstantialeffects.Second,theconsequencesarethemoreseverethe
more private investment is involved. It is therefore important to understand
the propagation of an asset price shock to private investment. Third, as a
stylized fact asset price slumps and recessions are often accompanied by fi-
nancial crises. In particular this last finding highlights the importance of fi-
nancial factors for the transmission of asset price shocks.
For this reason the relation between asset prices and bank lending has often
been analyzed for periods of severe economic and financial crisis.Popular ex-
amples are the great depression 1929 in the United States (Bernanke 1983,
1995;Eichengreen,Michener2003),thecollapseofrealestateandstockprices
in Japan in 1990 (Kim,Moreno 1994;Brunner,Kamin 1998),or the East Asia
Crisisin1997(Stiglitz,Greenwald2003;Carporale,Spagnolo2003).Theseand
other empirical studies of asset price bubbles provide details about how fi-
nancialfactorstransmitassetpriceshockstotherealeconomy(Higgins,Osler
1997). Private investment can be affected at least through two channels: Di-
rectly by eroding private firms’ value of equity capital, which might be re-
quired as collateral for a loan.Hence,firms lending opportunities shrink with
subsequent effects on investment. Second, and more indirectly, the drop in
asset prices may affect the balance sheets of banks and therefore their lending
capacities.In addition,a decline in asset prices may also recluce firms’ ability
to issue new shares. These arguments contrast with the view that a decline in
asset prices reduces firms’ investment opportunities by lowering their profit-
ability.
However,as specified by the literature asset price busts are not always accom-
panied by a financial crisis (Bordo, Jeanne 2002). It is, however, also possible
that a restriction in bank lending has dampening effects on economic activity
but do not lead to a real recession.Examples of such moderate real effects of
credit lending are reported by the literature on the bank lending channel of
monetary policy. Related empirical studies for the Euro Area find that
changes in interest rates have effects on bank lending only in some countries
and with different magnitudes (Altunbas et al. 2002; Angeloni et al. 2003; de
Bondt 1999; Kakes and Sturm 2002). Countries therefore where the bank
lending channel seems to play some role are Belgium, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal. In these countries the link
between bank lending and business investment may be important for the
4 Michael Frömmel and  Torsten Schmidttransmission of monetary policy (Angeloni et al. 2003). This result suggests
that differences in the financial systems of Euro Area member countries also
matter for other financial market shocks.
The aim of this paper therefore is to analyze the relation between asset prices
and bank lending before and after the stock market crash in 2000 in member
countries of the European monetary union.Our main hypothesis is that bank
lending is normally related to demand side factors such as GDP and interest
rates,but during some shorter periods is determined by other factors.In a first
step, we therefore test for cointegration between these variables. This ap-
proach is roughly in line with an empirical study for Germany (Deutsche
Bundesbank 2002).However,the recently established bank lending survey of
the Eurosystem provides some evidence that bank lending at least in some
countries was quite restrictive during recent years (Deutsche Bundesbank
2003). As suggested by the literature on asset price bubbles it is likely that
bank lending in the Euro Area was affected by the recent decline in asset
prices. To test this hypothesis we estimate an error correction equation in-
cluding the long-run credit demand determinants and changes in share prices
andbanks’equitycapitalasshort-termdeterminants.Toaccountforthepossi-
bility that bank lending is affected by these short-term factors only during rel-
atively short phases we allow the coefficients of this error correction equation
to switch between two states by estimation of a Markov regime switching
model. Using this approach it is possible to distinguish between a regime of
credit market equilibrium determined by demand factors and a regime were
bank lending is affected by asset prices or banks’ equity capital.
The outline of this paper is as follows:In section 2 we give a brief overview on
empirical research on determinants of bank lending.In section 3 we estimate
aggregated credit demand equations for a sample of European countries.In a
second step we investigate whether asset prices lead to a regime shift in deter-
minants of credit demand during the asset price bust. In particular we test
whether the drop of asset prices is related to a slowdown or decline of bank
lending.Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2. The link between asset prices and bank lending
Empirical studies on the determinants of bank lending find that measures of
economic activity, like GDP or industrial production, and interest rates in-
fluence the outstanding credit volume. The relation between both variables
and loans are usually interpreted as credit demand (Barajas, Steiner 2002;
Calza et al. 2003; Ghosh, Ghosh 1999; Pazarbasioglu 1997). A credit demand
equation of this form can be derived under simplifying assumptions from a
private firm balance sheet constraint (Friedman,Kuttner 1993:211).The rea-
soning behind the relation between GDP and loans is as follows: If a firm
decides to increase investment outlays over its net revenues it can do it by
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economic activity indicator can be seen as a broad measure of firms’ in-
vestment prospects and therefore in this case GDP is a proxy for credit
demand. Instead, a reduction of expected revenues also influences firms’
access to bank loans. In addition, if interest rates – the price for loans – in-
crease,this will reduce credit demand.
However, most of these empirical studies include variables which are related
to credit supply and can be derived from a bank balance sheet (Friedman,
Kuttner 1993: 214). Here we find two sets of variables: The first set indicates
banks’ ability to lend. In this context the most important variables are equity
capital of banks and bank deposits. In addition, the portfolio approach
suggests that banks aim at holding assets in specific relations to each other.
Thus,if the value of one asset changes substantially,the bank will adjust other
assets, too, to maintain these relations. Second, the theory of credit rationing
highlights the importance of banks’ willingness to lend and stresses the im-
portanceofnon-pricevariables.Theseideasareinlinewiththefindingsofem-
pirical studies that interest rates are highly important for credit demand.Indi-
cators of the banks’ willingness to lend are related measures for the riskiness
of assets and assets which can be used as collateral (Jaffee,Stiglitz 1990).
Recently,the interaction of asset prices,bank lending and investment was an-
alyzed in an extension of the Kiyotaki/Moore model (1997), in which bank
capital as well as firms’ net worth serve as collateral (Chen 2001). In this
model,a reduction in return on investments reduces the net worth of firms as
well as banks and therefore constraints the sum of bank loans and investment.
In addition, this reduction in investment lowers the prices of collateralized
assetsandagainerodesfirms’networthandbanks’lendingability.Thislineof
argument highlights the interaction of asset prices and bank lending rein-
forcingeachotherandthereforeamplifyingtheinitialshock.Themodeloffers
an explanation for the fact that depressions in asset markets are often accom-
panied by banking crises. Nevertheless, it is not necessary to focus only on fi-
nancialcrisesoreconomicrecessionsbecausethestrongeffectintheKiyotaki
and Moore model relies on some extreme assumptions. Under more general
specificationscollateralconstraintsmaystillamplifyunexpectedshocksinthe
economy but real effects are then much smaller (Cordoba, Ripoll 2004;
Kocherlakota 2000).Hence,this model already provides some insights for the
investigation of the phase after the asset price bust in 2000.
Moreover the approach can be extended by credit rationing, allowing credit
market conditions to change over time. Azariadis/Smith (1998) allow credit
market conditions to switch between a competitive market allocation and
credit rationing. Both regimes depend on private information about loan re-
payment probabilities. In the following we use this model as a theoretical
basing point.It provides a link between theoretical models of credit rationing
6 Michael Frömmel and  Torsten Schmidtand empirical studies by allowing demand factors to determine the out-
standing credit volume in the regime of credit market equilibrium. On the
other hand in the credit rationing regime also supply factors may affect bank
lending. This model of switching credit market conditions depicts changes in
credit growth over the business cycle but it is also possible to use it as a theo-
retical basis for analyzing singular events.
Periods in which unusual events cause credit markets to be temporarily in a
disequilibrium and restricted from the supply side are often called a credit
crunch or capital crunch. The ability or willingness of banks to lend is then
reduced:changes in the volume of credits are not in line with equilibrium de-
terminants such as overall economic activity and interest rates.This definition
of a credit crunch is closely related to the regime switching model described
above, emphasizing the supply side of the loan market. So it is not surprising
that empirical studies of credit crunches try to detect changing determinants
of the outstanding credit volume (recent examples are Barajas, Steiner 2002;
Ghosh, Ghosh 1999; Nehls, Schmidt 2004; Pazarbasioglu 1997). While credit
demand is usually assumed to be related to interest rates and economic ac-
tivity, the main problem is to identify economic variables which only affect
credit supply and are related to the source of the credit crunch.
As mentioned above,a first source of a credit crunch can be a burst of an asset
price bubble. An often cited example is the banking crisis in Japan after the
plunge of asset prices in the stock market and in the housing market in the
early nineties (Brunner, Kamin 1998; Kim, Moreno 1994). The case of Japan
stresses the crucial role of property as collateral for loans. A significant re-
lation between asset prices and bank lending was found for a number of
countries (Hofmann 2004).However,the erosion of collateral was aggravated
by the fact that japanese banks were allowed to hold shares. This means that
the stock valuations affect bank balance sheets and therefore their ability to
lend. The reduction of outstanding credit in the Euro Area after the strong
declineinassetpricescouldbeanindicatorforacreditcrunchatleastinsome
EU countries like Germany (Nehls, Schmidt 2004). Moreover, these factors
are likely to play a role in Austria and Belgium,too.
A second trigger of a credit crunch is seen in major reforms of regulation
standardsforthebankingsector.ThefirstBasleAccordforexamplemayhave
caused the credit crunch in the United States in the early nineties (Bernanke,
Lown 1991). In this case the crunch occurred because banks had to improve
theirbalancesheetpositionsandthereforehadtoreducetheirlendingactivity
for fulfilling the demands by the new regulation. With regard to the im-
portance of banks’ equity capital, some authors prefer to call this situation a
capital crunch.As is stressed in the literature on the bank lending channel the
magnitudeoftheeffectsofassetpricechangesonbankbalancesheetsdepend
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of regulation standards (Basle II) starting in 2000 may have already forced
banks to adjust their capital positions (Estrella 2004). Again, the discussion
about new capital standards might have led to a new credit crunch.This possi-
bilityisinparticularimportantforGermanybecauseitisoftenarguedthatthe
equity capital position of German banks is weak compared to international
standards of banks.But it is also likely that the preparation for the new capital
standards has lead to adjustments in bank balance sheets in other countries.
In what follows we investigate whether we can identify periods during which
outstanding bank credit in several European countries deviates from its long
run equilibrium.In addition,we study whether these deviations are related to
factors like asset prices or banks equity capital positions which are usually
seen as supply side determinants of bank lending.
3. Data description
In this analysis we use quarterly data for the period 1993 to 2004. Credit
volume is measured by MFI lending to non-financial corporations which is
drawn from national central banks as well as equity capital of banks. Several
structuralbreaksintheseseriesareremoved.NominalGDPandtenyeargov-
ernment bond yield are from the EUROSTAT database, except for Portugal
where we use data from the OECD database.The share price indices used are
those of Morgan Stanley.All variables except interest rates are in logarithms1.
While the sample period covers the first quarter of 1993 till the fourth quarter
of 2004 for most countries, due to reasons of data availability the series are
shorter for Greece (1998:3), Ireland (1997:1), Italy (1998:2) and Portugal
(1995:1).Furthermore,forGreeceandIrelandnodataonbanks’equitieswere
available to us.
4. The Long-Term Credit Equations
Togetanerrorcorrectionequationforcreditdemandweusethetwosteppro-
cedurebyEngle/Granger(1987).Inafirststepweestimatethelongruncredit
demand equation.We follow the literature,modeling the demand for loans as
a function of economic activity, GDP, and financing costs, which are given by
the interest rate. The GDP is expected to have a positive impact on the
demand for loans. This textbook effect can be explained by the influence of
economic activity on income and profits,and therefore finally on an increased
level of investment and consumption (inter alia Kashyap et al.). The interest
rateontheotherhandrevealsanegativeimpactonthedemandofloans,asthe
demand for loans depends on their price. Our analysis therefore starts with a
long-term credit demand equation of the form
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1 Unit root tests for the used series can be found in the appendix.(1) ky i tt t t =+⋅ +⋅+ ωα β ε
where kt is the log of the credit volume, yt the log of GDP,it the long-term in-
terest rate andε t is an error term.
Theestimationresultsforeq.1areshowninTable1.Allestimatedcoefficients
α for the impact of output on credit volume are significant and have the ex-
pected sign. For most countries the size of α covers the range between 0.427
(Finland) and 1.850 (Spain). For Portugal and Greece the elasticity of the
credit volume with respect to the output are higher and exceed 3.246 and
4.320.All coefficients for the influence of the output,however,are in line with
theory, i.e. they have a significantly positive sign, and they are close to the
results of other empirical studies2.
Regarding the influence of interest rates the results are less convincing. The
coefficients show the expected negative sign in 8 out of 11 cases, only four of
them being significant. For three countries (France, Portugal and Spain) the
coefficientispositive,inthecasesofPortugalandFranceevensignificant.This
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2 For instance Calza et al. (2003) find a coefficient for the whole Euro area of 1.457 for GDP,
Bundesbank (2003) find for Germany, depending on the type of loans, between 1.14 and 1.67.
Hofmann (2004) finds for various European countries values between 1.269 and 2.169.observation, however, may be explained by the steadily declining real and
nominal interest rates in the Euro area prior to and following the launch of
EMU and is in line with other recent studies (for instance Calza et al., 2003).
We have also tried other specifications of the long term credit equation, in-
cluding real variables and GMM estimators with various sets of instrument
variables3.However,as the results do not substantially change,we rely on the
OLS estimation as given in Table 1.
5. Analysis of Deviations from the Long-Term Credit Demand
Assuming that the credit equations from section 4 form a long run equi-
librium,one may model the short term dynamic as an error correction model
(ECM):
(2) [] ∆∆ ka b k y i c k u t tt t t t =+⋅ − +⋅ +⋅ +⋅ + −− − − 11 1 1 () ωα β
=+⋅ +⋅ + −− ab c k u tt t ε 11 ∆
wherea,bandcarerealnumbers,and tistheresidualfromeq.1,thatisthede-
viation of credit volume from the long run equation. Furthermore, to take
some autocorrelation in the error terms into account, we add the lagged
change in credit volume ∆kt−1 to the equation. While it is common to assume
thattheerrorcorrectioncoefficientbisalwayspresentandconstantovertime,
we use a Markov switching error correction model (MS-ECM)4,in which the
presence or the speed of adjustment may differ depending on the
unobservable regime s t. This state variable s t may take the values 1 and 2,
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We refer to this model as the basic model.The specification of eq.(3) and (4)
provides much flexibility to the estimation: As we do not place any prior as-
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3 The estimation results are available from the authors on request.
4 This model has been – for instance – applied for estimating bubbles in British house prices
(Hall,Psaradakis,Sola1997),forexchangeratesintheEuropeanMonetarySystem(Bessec2002).sumption on the adjustment process to the long run equation, it may be
presentornot,orsimplydifferinspeedbetweenthestates.Evenregardingthe
number of regime switches we do not need the prerequisite that there is more
than one switch. The model is flexible enough to deal with a permanent
change5.
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p 0.881 0.835 0.853 0.971 0.981
q 0.980 0.902 0.932 0.972 0.972
Wald 2() bb 12 = 13.833 7.443 3.100 2.079 10.410
Wald 3() cc 12 = 9.553 0.534 – 2.520 2.641









































































p 0.961 0.770 0.760 0.574 0.894 0.948
q 0.889 0.912 0.899 0.951 0.938 0.876
Wald 2() bb 12 = 1.052 10.259 10.402 0.906 3.976 8.874
Wald 3() cc 12 = 0.427 3.142 4.007 4.277 0.333 52.465
Standard errors are given in parentheses.Asterisks refer to level of significance.– ***:1 per cent,
**:5 per cent,*:10 per cent.– Wald 1 (2,3):Wald test against the null hypothesis that the constant
(coefficientforerrorcorrection/laggedcreditvolume)isequalinbothregimes.– 1Modelwithlag-
ged change of credit volume does not converge for Finland.
Table 2
5 Hamilton (1993) states:“Some might object that a change in regime could be represented as a
permanentchange…,ratherthanthecyclingandbackandforthbetweenstates1and2thatseems
tobeimplicitin(1.2)[i.e.theMarkovchain].Howeverthespecification(1.2)allowsthepossibility
of a permanent change as a special case if p21=0.”(p.235).Estimationresultsofeq.(3)and(4)arepresentedinTable2.Intheestimation
the error correction coefficient b1 respectively b2 is of main interest. Most
countries show one regime which is stabilizing,that is b1 (we regard to the sta-
bilizing regime as regime 1 without any loss of generality) is significantly
smaller than zero. The only exceptions are the Netherlands and Spain, for
which b1 is negative without being significant.The results,however,differ for
b2 :For France it is significantly negative,too,indicating that both regimes are
characterized by an adjustment to the equilibrium, with different speeds. For
SpainandGermanyb2 takesasignificantlypositivevalue,whereasforthema-
jority of countries b2 does not significantly differ from zero at all. It is
thereforeinformativetolookatstandardWaldtestsagainstthenullofbb 12 = .
The results are given in the rows at the bottom of Table 2. Indeed, for all
countries but France we find significantly different values of b1 and b2 in both
regimes.Summing up so far,there is evidence that most countries of the Euro
area, France being the only exception, show a stable regime with mean re-
versiontothelong-termcreditequationandanunstableregime,whichisatits
best inconclusive. The differences between b1 and b2 are for these countries
statistically significant.
It is now straightforward to introduce additional explanatory variables. The
rationale is that the credit volume may react in different ways to other factors
dependingfromwhetherweareinthestable(meanreversiontothelongterm
relationship) or in the unstable regime (no tendency to return).Therefore we




ab c C d s h a r e s e k us
a
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t tt t tt
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+⋅ +⋅ +⋅ +⋅ + = −− 11 1 1 1 1 1 ε ,
+⋅ +⋅ +⋅ +⋅ + =
⎧
⎨
⎩ −− bc C d s h a r e s e k u s t tt t tt 21 2 2 2 1 2 ε∆ Β ∆ ,
which additionally takes into account the availability of banks’ capital and the
influence of asset prices,representing the bank lending and the balance sheet
channel of transmission. Whilst the variable ∆BC is defined as the change in
logs of the bank capital, the variable shares measures the deviation of the re-
spective national stock index from its long term trend6. This reflects ongoing
under- or overvaluation of companies, which may perpetually prevent banks
from expanding their credit offers to companies.
We apply this extended MS-ECM to the countries from table 2. The esti-
mation results are given in table 3.Indeed the estimations provide some addi-
tional insights. Results for Belgium, Germany, Ireland and Portugal show sig-
nificant differences (in terms of the Wald test) between the significant ECM
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6 We assume a constant long term rate of return for the stock market.For both variables we tried
different specifications,among them a bank capital to credit volume ratio instead of ∆BC and log
changes of the stock market index for shares.These variations do not substantially change results,
but in the case of shares the significance suffers.Bank Lending and Asset Prices in the Euro Area 13
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p 0.980 0.805 0.974 0.952 0.961
q 0.870 0.768 0.974 0.976 0.982
Wald 2() bb 12 = 0.520 32.668*** 1.143 1.564 19.003***
Wald 3 () cc 12 = 0.112 0.427 0.728 2.937 6.605**
Wald 3 () dd 12 = 0.994 15.055*** 14.257*** 1.172 8.683***
Wald 3() ee 12 = 0.024 0.029 0.045 0.018 1.196



















































































































p 0.631 0.853 0.915 0.968 0.517 0.971
q 0.783 0.722 0.999 0.962 0.903 0.978
Wald 2() bb 12 = 0.740 10.646*** 0.001 0.107 4.280** 1.172
Wald 3 () cc 12 = – – 0.013 0.130 1.880 6.216**
Wald 3() dd 12 = 2.632* 2.970* 0.003 4.036** 3.356* 8.612***
Wald 3 () ee 12 = 52.603*** 3.961** 4.647** 0.050 3.359* 18.243***
Standard errors given in parentheses. Asterisks refer to level of significance. – ***: 1 per cent,
**: 5 per cent,*:10 per cent.
Table 3coefficient b1 of the stable regime and the respective coefficient b2 of the un-
stable regime. Furthermore, for these countries there are significant dif-
ferences in the influence of the stock market development between the
regimes.For Belgium,Germany and Portugal there is a clear pattern:During
unstable periods there is a strong positive influence of stock market
movements on the credit volume. This means that deviations from the
long-term development of the credit volume go ahead with movements in the
stockmarket:thecreditvolumetendstodecline(increase)whensharesprices
are below (above) average. During the stable regime, however, a similar be-
haviorforbanks’capitalseemsnottoexist,exceptforGermany.Incontrastto
these three countries (i.e.Belgium,Germany and Portugal) we find a relation
in the opposite direction for Ireland:here the positive relation is in the stable
regime, meaning that an increase in stock prices brings the credit volume
closer to the long term trend.
For Austria,Finland,ItalyandSpaintheresultsremaininconclusive.Although
there are different degrees of stability between the regimes,most coefficients
are not statistically significant and the Wald tests do not indicate significant
differences between regimes.
France, Greece and the Netherlands finally, show two stable regimes with sig-
nificantly negative ECM coefficients.The two regimes only differ in the speed
of adjustment.However,France and the Netherlands show a higher influence
of shares prices in the unstable than in the stable regime (significantly dif-
ferent only for the Netherlands). We interpret this as a slightly dampening
effect of the stock market on the credit growth.
Summing up so far,we find evidence for the existence of a stable (tendency to
returntothecreditdemandequation)andanunstable(notendencytoreturn)
regime for Belgium, Germany, Ireland and Portugal. Except for Ireland the
movement away from the demand equation shoes a positive relation to the
movement of the stock market.For Germany we even find some evidence for
a relation to the growth bank capital. Furthermore, we even find for France
and the Netherlands,for which we can find no unstable regime,that the stock
market development affects the speed of adjustment to the long term
equation. For the other countries (Austria, Finland, Greece, Italy and Spain)
the evidence is inconclusive.
6. Conclusions
This paper analyses the development of the credit volume in the countries of
the Euro area.The analysis is based on the construction of a long-term credit
demandequation.Theactualcreditvolumeisthencomparedtothislong-term
trend and deviations are analyzed in detail by applying a Markov switching
14 Michael Frömmel and  Torsten Schmidterror corrction model to the deviations. We find for several European
countries (Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) strong evidence
for switching between a stable, mean reverting regime, and one unstable,
bubble-like regime,which does not show a tendency to return to the long-run
demand equation. While France, Greek and the Netherlands show two
regimes with different speeds of adjustments only, the three remaining
countries Austria, Italy and Spain show only weak evidence of regime
switches.
Furthermore, we find a positive relation between the credit volume and the
development of the stock market in the unstable regime for Belgium,
Germany and Portugal, as well as for Finland, France and the Netherlands in
the regime with lower adjustment speed, which is significantly higher than in
theotherregime.Asignificantinfluenceofthebanks’capital,however,isonly
visible in the case of Germany.
From these results we conclude,that there are constraints,which may tempo-
rarily dampen lending of banks to the private sector,and even drive away the
credit volume from the long term demand equation. Whether these con-
straintsleadtoareallackofcredits,oronlyaffecttheadjustmentspeed,seems
todependoncountry-specificcharacteristics.Acrucialroleisattributedtothe
development of stock markets and therefore our analysis is linked to the lit-
erature on the credit channel. The results, however, do not clearly indicate,
whether the impact of the asset price growth works via the supply side or the
demand side. In contrast, the availability of bank capital seems to play only a
minor role in most countries, except of Germany. Our findings even affect
monetary policy, which needs to take into account the development of asset
prices when conducting monetary policy, because there seems to be a sub-
stantial, and between countries of the Euro area asymmetric effect on the
transmission mechanism.
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Figure 1Unit Root test results for time series used in the empirical analysis
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ADF Unit Root tests

















Austria –-2.63 –5.44*** –2.99 –4.57*** –1.20 –6.67*** –1.27 –4.03***
Belgium –2.00 –4.38*** –2.89 –4.31*** –1.36 –7.65*** –1.25 –6.66***
Finland –2.39 –4.58*** –2.25 –4.31*** –1.04 –6.70*** –1.74 –5.41***
France –3.14 –9.45*** –3.37* –4.12*** –1.17 –6.73*** –1.47 –7.71***
Germany –3.02 –6.33*** –3.22* –4.44*** –1.43 –6.96*** 0.34 –4.20***
Ireland –0.08 –8.87*** –3.10 –4.95*** –1.53 –7.61*** n.a. n.a.
Italy –2.00 –4.38*** –2.16 –3.68** –1.58 –6.66*** –3.75** –6.24***
Netherland –1.31 –6.49*** –3.29* –4.45*** –1.00 –6.97*** –0.53 –6.07***
Portugal n.a. n.a. –2.69 –4.28*** –1.46 –6.39*** –1.01 –4.53***
Spain –5.30*** –7.05*** –2.85 –3.44** –1.36 –7.14*** –2.15 –6.81***
LagselectionbySIC.Laglengtharenotreported.–***,**,*indicatessignificanceatthe1,5and
10 percent level using Mac Kinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. – c, t: a constant and a trend is in-
cluded. – c: only a constant is included.
Table 4
ADF Unit Root Tests for Credits
Sample Level (c,t) Change (c)
Austria 93:1 – 04:4 1.26 –4.58***
Belgium 93:1 – 04:4 0.03 –3.14**
Finland 93:1 – 04:4 –2.13 –4.81***
France 93:2 – 04:2 –2.55 –2.29*
Germany 93:1 – 04:4 0.74 0.48
Ireland 93:1 – 04:4 –2.13 –2.99**
Italy 98:2 – 04:4 –0.89 –3.86***
Netherlands 93:1 – 04:4 –0.95 –5.97***
Portugal 93:1 – 04:4 –3.65** –2.43
Spain 93:1 – 04:4 –4.92*** –3.46**
Table 5
Zivot Andrews Unit Root test for series with unknown break points for German credit
Modell A
stat. Break point
–5.0985*** 2001:3
TheZA-testisperformedusingtheGAUSScodeprovidedbyJunsooLee.ZivotAndrews(1992).